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PAYMENT PROTECTION INSURANCE (PPI) MISSELLING:
SOME LESSONS FROM THE UK
ANDROMACHI GEORGOSOULI
***
The misselling of Payment Protection Insurance (“PPI”) is a
longstanding problem in the UK. The Treating Customers Fairly (“TCF”)
initiative was introduced to tackle this problem but, despite its
sophisticated inception, its effectiveness has been limited. This Article
canvasses the main features of TCF as a management-based approach to
regulation and highlights its initial appeal. Against this backdrop, it draws
on the recent UK experience with recurring instances of PPI misselling to
offer an account of the principal causes of its shortcomings in the retail
financial sector. It argues that the perceived failure of this regulatory
approach may be attributed to the following three factors: (i) the
rulification of TCF; (ii) several shortcomings of the existing data resource
management; and (iii) the absence of a system of credible deterrence to
support the Financial Conduct Authority’s attempts to be proactive and to
inflict cultural change at regulated firm level. The Article concludes with a
summary of key lessons that may be drawn from the UK experience.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

Financial misselling describes selling practices in the retail
financial sector that exploit the customer’s reliance on the expertise,
advice, and professionalism of the provider of the financial product or
service in question. Typically, it is a deliberative strategy to sell financial
products that customers do not need.1 Financial misselling has a long
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history in the UK. In the 1990s, misled workers pulled out of company
final-salary pension schemes and enrolled in plans that were linked to stock
market returns.2 During the same period, mortgage endowment policies and
Card and Identity Protection Insurance (“CIPI”) were missold to
consumers.3 The misselling of Payment Protection Insurance (“PPI”) has
perhaps been worse.4 It started off in the 1980s and has been recurring ever
since.5 In view of its magnitude, this Article will focus on the regulatory
response to PPI misselling as a case study.

an earlier version of this Article and to Matteo Angelini for his assistance. Any
errors are my own.
1
Practices of predatory lending in the US are similar but not identical to financial
misselling in the UK. A major difference concerns the locus of these phenomena. The
majority of predatory lending has been associated with the subprime sector. In the
UK, financial misselling occurs in the mainstream retail financial sector. See Richard
V. Ericson & Aaron Doyle, The Institutionalization of Deceptive Sales in Life
Insurance: Five Sources of Moral Risk¸ 46 BRIT. J. CRIM. 993, 993–1010 (explaining
the impact on the life insurance sector by financial misselling in the US through
empirical studies); Nicole L. Fuentes, Defrauding the American Dream: Predatory
Lending in Latino Communities and Reform of California’s Lending Law, 97 CALIF.
L. REV. 1279, 1279–1335 (2009) (discussing predatory lending in the United States);
SYNOVATE LTD., CONSUMER MARKET STUDY ON ADVICE WITHIN THE AREA OF
RETAIL INVESTMENT SERVICES – FINAL REPORT (2011), available at
http://e.c.europa.eu/consumers/archive/rights/docs/investment _advice_study_en.pdf
(providing investment advice to 27 member states of the EU).
2
Nearly one million of them eventually won compensation totaling £11.8
billion. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., NATIONWIDE AVC & PENSION SCHEME INTEREST RATE
FINAL
RETURNS,
available
at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/fsavcreview/fsavc-bs-returns.pdf.
3
Card and Identity Protection Policyholder to Claim Compensation by 30
CONDUCT
AUTH.
(Mar.
3,
2014),
August
2014,
FIN.
http://www.fca.org.uk/news/compensation-for-card-and-identity-protectionpolicyholders; see also FIN. SERVS. AUTH., ENDOWMENT MORTGAGE
COMPLAINTS: FEEDBACK ON CP75 AND ‘FINAL’ TEXT (2001), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/ps75.pdf.
4
See Luis Lobo-Guerrero, Uberrima Fides, Foucault, and the Security of
Uncertainty, 26 INT’L J. SEMIOTICS L. 23, 31–32 (2013) (explaining the practice of
PPI misselling and its history in the UK).
5
Julia Black & Richard Nobles, Personal Pensions Misselling: The Causes and
Lessons of Regulatory Failure, 61 MOD. L. REV. 789, 789–820 (1998) (pointing out that
misselling is one of the key drivers that led to reform of the system of financial
regulation in the late 1990s); James Pickford, PPI Dominates as Consumer Complaints
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PPI provides insurance against the risk that a borrower will be
unable to maintain credit repayments for specified reasons as, for example,
when he is unable to work or due to an accident.6 PPI is not suitable for
everyone. Suppose, for instance, that X is applying for a loan in order to
buy a car. He is perfectly healthy, he is educated, and his family can help
him out financially if he finds himself temporarily out of work in the
future. He does not need a PPI, but he is forced to buy PPI. For example,
he is told that it is better to purchase PPI, because otherwise he will have to
pay an increased interest for the loan that he is applying for. In other
instances, it may be the case that PPI goes together with a personal loan (or
a mortgage) as a compulsory component, but customers are never alerted of
that fact.
The predecessor of the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) on
matters of consumer protection and conduct of business – the Financial
Services Authority (“FSA”) – made PPI misselling an early priority when it
assumed responsibility for the regulation of general insurance
intermediation in 2005.7 Initially, the FSA tried to work with the industry.
The Treating Customers Fairly initiative (“TCF”) stood at the epicentre of
the regulator’s approach and it was launched in 2006 with the aim of
intensifying the FSA’s attempt to attune business culture with the delivery
of fair treatment for customers as part of its consumer protection mandate.8
The TCF is sophisticated in its inception, but thus far has proved to
be ineffective in deterring instances of financial misselling. Between 2006
and 2008, selling practices in the retail financial sector revealed poor
suitability checks and training, ineffective systems and controls, and
Hit Record High, FIN. TIMES (May 19, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/24610976df6d-11e3-a4cf-00144feabdc0. html#axzz38gfKumLG.
6
See Ellis Ferran, Regulatory Lessons from the Payment Protection Insurance
Mis-selling Scandal in the UK, 13 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 247, 250 (2012)
(providing various working definitions of PPI); Final Notice from Fin. Servs. Auth.
to Lloyds TSB Bank plc and Bank of Scotland plc (Feb. 15, 2013), available at
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/fca/documents/final-notices/
lloyds-bankinggroup.pdf.
7
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., TREATING CUSTOMERS FAIRLY AFTER THE POINT OF
SALE 7 (2001), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp7.pdf; Clive
Briault, Managing Dir. Retail Markets, Fin. Servs. Auth., Treating Customers
Fairly: Progress and Future Plans at the FSA Treating Customers Fairly
Conference
(Oct.
4,
2005)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2005).
8
See infra pp. 8–12 (discussing the nature of TCF).

264

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 21.1

inadequate provision of information to customers. There were also
problems with the resolution of disputes, the taking of disciplinary action,
and delays in the provision of financial redress. For example, it was not
until the second half of 2011 that large-scale redress of past misselling
began. Things do not seem to have improved.9 In July 2014, a new set of
complaints about “another PPI scandal” hit the news this time challenging
the capabilities of the new regulator – the Financial Conduct Authority – to
do a better job than its predecessor.10 As it transpired, more than 60,000
small businesses were missold fixed-rate business loans to protect them
against interest rate changes without being informed that a swap was added
to the transaction or that the swap could possibly have the reverse effect.11
These introductory remarks give rise to the following question:
Why is TCF failing to deliver? In this Article, I will attempt to offer an
answer to this question. I will start with a brief account of the legal
underpinnings and the nature of the TCF. Against this background, I will
try to demonstrate that the shortcomings of this approach may be attributed
to a combination of the following three factors: (a) the rulification of TCF
namely a regulatory strategy that was originally conceived as informal,
flexible, and responsive in nature; (b) certain flaws in the data resource
management that is currently in place to facilitate the electronic reporting
of PPI related data and other conduct of business and consumer protection
issues; and (c) the absence of a system of credible deterrence to back up
proactive intervention that aims to inflict cultural change and to attune
business ethics with the delivery of public policy objectives – here, that of
fair treatment for customers.
These parameters do not exhaustively account for all of those
market, institutional, legal, behavioural, and cognitive conditions that
inhibit the effective implementation of TCF. Poor standard setting,
capture, creative compliance, the implementation of a regime of corporate
governance regulation that falls short of providing rewards for the delivery
of good quality of services to retail financial customers, and the level and
nature of competition in the relevant industry are only some of a plethora of
other considerations that could be enlisted as factors that circumscribe the
effectiveness of TCF. However, in view of space constraints, the purpose
of this Article is not to offer a comprehensive account of all the causes of
9

See infra pp. 14–24 (examining the main causes).
Adrian Quine, Banks Face New Mis-selling Scandal, BBC NEWS (Jul. 3,
2014), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-28037608.
11
Id.
10
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the TCF failings, but to discuss those of them that, in the opinion of the
author, have not received the attention they deserve.
II.

THE REGULATION OF PPI: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE
LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Pre-crisis, the Financial Services Authority was the single UK
mega-regulator with a wide range of powers at its disposal. Consumer
protection was one of the four FSA statutory objectives under the Financial
Services and Markets Act (“FSMA”) 2000.12 The other three were market
confidence, financial stability, and the reduction of financial crime.13 The
Financial Services Act 2012 changed this. As of April 2013, the FSA was
abolished and replaced by the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) and
the Prudential Regulation Authority (“PRA”), the latter being a subsidiary
of the Bank of England.14 The FCA and the PRA are focus-specific with a
separate set of statutory objectives to deliver. They are operationally
independent and at least on paper of equal institutional standing. The
strategic objective of the FCA is to ensure that financial markets function
well.15 To this effect, the FCA is responsible for consumer protection,
market integrity, and competition in the interests of consumers.16 The PRA
is the primary micro-prudential regulator and part of its mandate is to offer
a helping hand to the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England
in delivering its financial stability objective.17
Despite their distinct institutional standing, the statutory objectives
of the PRA and the FCA are not exclusive to the regulatory agency that
they are attached to. This is particularly evident in relation to the
regulation of the insurance sector for the purposes of policyholder
12

See Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 5 (U.K.).
Id. at §§ 1(3), 6, 26(1)(a), 3, 3A, 9 (showing that the fifth objective, “public
awareness,” § 4, was eventually omitted by virtue of amendments that were
introduced under §§ 2(3) and 26(3) of the Financial Services Act, 2010
(Commencement No. 1 and Transitional Provision) Order 2010, S.I. 2010/2480,
2)).
14
Andromachi Georgosouli, The FCA-PRA Coordination Scheme and the
Challenge of Policy Coherence, 8 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 62, 62–65 (2013).
15
Financial Services Act, 2012, c. 1, § 1B(2) (U.K.) (amending Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000).
16
Id. at §§ 1B(2), 1(C), 1D, 1E, 3 (promoting consumer protection, market
integrity, and competition).
17
Id. at § 2B (“The PRA’s general objective”).
13
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protection. Granted that policyholders are a sub-group of consumers, one
would expect that their protection would fall within the remit of the FCA in
view of the FCA’s statutory objective of consumer protection. However,
the UK legislator opted for a more complex route. The Financial Services
Act 2012 entrusts the protection of policyholders to the PRA and not the
FCA, presumably to highlight the fact that the protection of this special
group of consumers is a matter of prudential regulation calling primarily
for solvent and sound insurance firms.18 Nevertheless, the FCA
complements the work of the PRA. The tackling of PPI misselling, in
particular, falls within the competence of the FCA, given its primary
responsibility on matters of conduct of business, part of which is the fair
treatment of customers.
A combination of primary and secondary legislation alongside
common law doctrines on contract, agency, and tortuous liability comprises
the regulation of PPI. Until recently, the regulation of consumer credit fell
under the province of the Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) under the
Consumer Credit Act (“CCA”) 1974.19 Credit agreements financed PPI
premiums under CCA, while the writing and marketing of the policies were
regulated under the FSMA, causing unnecessary overlaps and
inconsistencies.20 As of April 2014 and in light of amendments to the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which were introduced by the
Financial Services Act 2012, the FCA is now the regulator of consumer
credit, taking over the responsibilities of the OFT and thus bringing
consumer credit firms under its consumer and conduct of business
mandate.21
18

Id. at § 2C (“Insurance objective”).
See Consumer Credit Act, 1974, c. 39, §§ 1(1), 3 (U.K.).
20
See Consumer Credit Act, 2006, c. 37 §§ 9(4), 20(1), 60, 61, 54 (U.K.). See
generally Consumer Credit (Total Charge for Credit), 2010, S.I. 2010/1011, 4
(U.K.) (TCC Regulations); Consumer Credit (Agreements), 2010, S.I. 2010/1014
(U.K.); Financial Service Act (Consumer Credit), 2013, Stat. R. & O. 2013/1882
(U.K.) (transferring regulatory powers from the Office of Fair Trading to the
Financial Conduct Authority, which became responsible for consumer credit as of
April 2014); see also Eva Lomnicka, The Future on Consumer Credit Regulation:
A Chance to Rationale Sanctions for Breaches of Financial Services Regulatory
Regimes, 34 COMPANY LAW., 13, 13 (2013) (documenting the problems with the
previous regime).
21
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., CONSUMER CREDIT SOURCEBOOK (2014), available
at http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/CONC (setting out the main rules for those
firms providing consumer credit).
19

2014

PAYMENT PROTECTION INSURANCE

267

Not unlike the FSA, the FCA has a wide range of disciplinary and
enforcement powers at its disposal.22 Some of them are discussed in further
detail later.23 For the time being and as a general remark, it is important to
note that the FCA has, inter alia, the power to (a) impose administrative
fines, (b) withdraw authorisation and permissions, (c) apply for injunctions
and restitution orders, and (d) prosecute certain criminal offences.24 Of
particular relevance to the tackling of PPI misselling is new section 138D
(former section 150) establishing a civil law remedy for the aggrieved party
to seek compensation,25 sections 225 to 233 setting out the role of the
Financial Ombudsman Service (“FOS”) in handling consumer complaints
and in granting compensation where appropriate, and section 404 on
consumer redress schemes.26 To ensure that the regulator’s disciplinary
action will be visible enough to have an impact on the conduct of market
actors, new section 391 (1ZB) also enables the FCA to publish information
about warning notices in certain cases.27 On paper, this looks like a
significant departure from the previous regime, under which the earliest
that the FSA could publish details of a disciplinary matter was when it
issued a final notice at the conclusion of a case (e.g., after the Tribunal had
reached a decision). In reality, the effect of this amendment must not be
blown out of proportion. A careful reading of the relevant provision
reveals that the regulator must, inter alia, consult with the person to whom
the notice is given. In addition, the FCA’s power to publish information
22

See Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, Part XI (amended 2012)
(U.K.), for the disciplinary powers of the FCA. See id. at Part XIV for the powers
of FCA to gather information and conduct investigation.
23
See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
24
See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION GUIDE (2013),
available at http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/enforcement-informationguide.
25
Only “private persons” are eligible to make use of this statutory civil law
remedy. See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Rights of Actions), 2001,
S.I. 2001/544 (U.K.); Titan Steel Wheels Ltd. v. The Royal Bank of Scot. PLC,
[2010] EWHC (Comm) 211, [76] (Eng.) (finding a corporation did not qualify to
bring an action under § 150 of the FSMA because it was acting in the course of
business); Figurasin v. Cent. Capital Ltd., [2014] EWCA (Civ) 504 (Eng.).
26
These are to be read in conjunction with the Consumer Redress Schemes
Sourcebook (CONRED) of the FCA Handbook. See generally FIN. CONDUCT
AUTH., CONSUMER REDRESS SCHEME SOURCEBOOK (CONRED) (2014), available
at http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/CONRED.
27
See Financial Services Act, 2012, c. 21, § 37 (U.K.).
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about warning notices is restricted by virtue of section 391(6), which
prohibits the FCA from publishing information when the publication would
be (a) unfair to the person against whom that action was proposed to be
taken; (b) prejudicial to the interests of consumers; or (c) detrimental to the
stability of the UK financial system.
Secondary legislation adds a further layer of detail with regard to
the conduct of business in the retail financial sector and the procedural
aspects of supervision, compliance, and enforcement.28 Of particular
relevance here is the Insurance Conduct of Business Sourcebook
(“ICOBS”). This constitutes a more concrete statement of the FCA
Principles for Businesses and comprises the main body of rules and
guidance that underpins the conduct of business of insurance services
providers.29 Alongside general and transitional provisions, the ICOBS sets
out, inter alia, the details regarding the identification of, and provision of
advice to, clients (chapter 5), product information, including PPI
requirements (chapter 6), cancellation rights (chapter 7), and claims
handling (chapter 8). Further, and with respect to the selling of PPI, firms
are under the legal obligation to establish the eligibility of the customer in
question (ICOBS, 5.1.2R) and to bring to the customer’s attention the
importance of reading the policy contract documentations prior to the
expiry of the period of cancellation (ICOBS, 6.4.5R).30 Finally, the FCA
Handbook contains a comprehensive set of rules and guidance on dispute
resolution and complaints handling, including the handling of PPI
complaints.31
III.

THE NATURE OF TCF AND THE GROUNDS THAT
INFORMED ITS IMPLEMENTATION

Under Principle 6 (customers’ interests) of the FCA Principles for
Businesses, “a firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers
28

See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., INSURANCE: CONDUCT OF BUSINESS
SOURCEBOOK ch. 5–6 (2014), available at http://media.fshandbook.info/
content/full/ ICOBS.pdf.
29
The Principles for Businesses are set out in PRIN 2.1.1 and they are
identical to the FSA High Level Principles for Business. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH.,
PRINCIPLES OF BUSINESS § 2.1.1 (2014), available at http://fshandbook.info/
FS/html/FCA/PRIN/2/1.pdf.
30
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 28, ch. 5–8.
31
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: COMPLAINTS §§ 1.3, 3, app. 3
(2014), available at http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/DISP.
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and treat them fairly.” In pursuance of this Principle, TCF asks the
industry to work out for itself what practices guarantee fair treatment for
clients in a manner that is attuned to the policy goals and priorities of the
regulator. These goals are encapsulated in the following six TCF
outcomes:32
“Outcome 1: Consumers can be confident that they are dealing with
firms where the fair treatment of customers is central to the corporate
culture.
Outcome 2: Products and services marketed and sold in the retail
market are designed to meet the needs of identified consumer groups and
are targeted accordingly.
Outcome 3: Consumers are provided with clear information and are
kept appropriately informed before, during, and after the point of sale.
Outcome 4: Where consumers receive advice, the advice is suitable
and takes account of their circumstances.
Outcome 5: Consumers are provided with products that perform as
firms have led them to expect, and the associated service is of an acceptable
standard.
Outcome 6: Consumers do not face unreasonable post-sale barriers
imposed by firms to change product, switch provider, submit a claim, or
make a complaint.”
TCF is not a new set of secondary legislation. It is a guidance that
reflects key elements of the UK regulator’s strategy in the retail financial
sector. The outcomes that firms are expected to deliver are communicated
through informal means as, for example, Policy Statements (“PS”) and
“Dear CEO Letters.” From this, however, it does not follow that this
otherwise informal guidance has no bearing on the taking of enforcement
action.33 Indeed, the six TCF outcomes enlisted above do not stand in
isolation from the FCA Handbook, despite the fact that strictly speaking
they do not form part of secondary legislation.34 For all intended purposes,

32

See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., TREATING CUSTOMERS FAIRLY – A GUIDE TO
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION (2007), available at http://www.fca.org.uk/
firms/being-regulated/meeting-your-obligations/fair-treatment-of-customers.pdf.
33
Ferran, supra note 6, at 259 (characterizing the TCF outcomes as “nonbinding guidance”).
34
John Tiner, Address at the Ins. Sector Conference (Sept. 21, 2006),
available
at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/
2006/0320_jt.shtml.
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they echo the FCA Principles for Businesses.35 Further, they are linked to a
range of other Handbook provisions in the sense that they constitute a set of
more concrete benchmarks against which compliance is to be assessed.
Arguably, TCF can be described as a management-based approach
to regulation.36 It combines elements of performance-based and processoriented strategies whereby the focus is on processes, systems and controls,
internal management, and the monitoring of performance in delivering
tangible outcomes pertaining to the fair treatment of customers. Quite
often, the management-based, performance-based, and process-oriented
approaches to regulation are used interchangeably in the literature, but for
systematic purposes, it is important to highlight some key differences. In
the case of management-based regimes, firms are expected to develop plans
and monitoring systems for the delivery of certain public policy objectives.
Accordingly, compliance is assessed in terms of whether the implemented
systems and controls are fit for purpose. Process-oriented regulation
focuses on the firms' engagement in a process of comprehensive selfevaluation, design, and management of their business.
Finally,
performance-based regulation constitutes an extension of principles-based
regulation in the sense that it focuses on the attainment of outcomes,
leaving the regulated population to decide how best these can be achieved.
Similar to the approach that was adopted by its predecessor, the
FCA’s intervention takes the form of a combination of proactive and
reactive measures. The purpose of proactive measures is to mitigate the
risk that the customers of a specific firm will not be treated fairly. Reactive
intervention typically takes the form of disciplinary and enforcement
action, the aim of which is primarily to provide some sort of redress to the
aggrieved party and to deter future misconduct. Over the years, there has
been a clear preference for proactive intervention and industry engagement
(e.g. through road shows, working with the industry, mystery shopping,
etc.), while enforcement has been generally regarded as a measure of last
resort.
35

These were formerly labelled as the FSA High-Level Principles of Business.
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 29.
36
See Andromachi Georgosouli, The FSA’s Treating Customers Fairly (TCF)
Initiative: What is so Good About it and Why it May Not Work, 38 J.L.S. 405, 410
(2011); Cary Coglianese & David Laser, Management-Based Regulation:
Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
691, 693–694 (2003) (considering the distinction between management-based,
process-oriented and performance-based approaches).
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Specifically, in pursuing its proactive intervention agenda, the UK
regulator has the power to take a range of intrusive measures with respect
to issues such as the allocation of resources and competences, the nature of
staff training, and the kind of remedial action that may be deemed
necessary in the event of a customer complaint. Moreover, the regulator
has a comprehensive toolkit to attune business culture and patterns of selfgovernance to match TCF targets.37 For example, the “product life-cycle” is
a regulatory device that guides firms in their attempt to align their TCF
strategy with the priorities and the expectations of the FCA from the early
stages of planning and production through to after-sale services. Other
regulatory measures that work in a similar fashion include the FCA's
Culture framework, which intends to help firms build TCF into their
culture, and Management Information (“MI”), the purpose of which is to
make it easier for senior managers to keep things in perspective when
managing data, while making it possible for the FCA to get a more accurate
view of the firms' capacity to deliver TCF outcomes.38
The regulator’s reactive intervention essentially reflects its strategy
of compliance and enforcement. The case of Alliance & Leicester
(“A&L”) is a classic example not least because it set the tone of the
regulator’s policy of compliance and enforcement that is still implemented
today.39 A&L was ordered to pay the biggest fine for serious failings in the
selling of PPI pre-crisis.40 However, A&L also agreed to implement a
customer contract programme overseen by third-party accountants. Under
37

Alliance and Leicester to Pay £7 million Fines for PPI Failings, FIN. SERVS.
AUTH. (Oct. 7, 2008), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/
communication/pr/2008/115.shtml; Georgosouli, supra note 33, at 415–16.
38
TCF
Culture,
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH.
(Apr.
5,
2013),
http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/being-regulated/meeting-your-obligations/fairtreatment-of-customers/Culture; FIN. SERVS. AUTH., TREATING CUSTOMERS
FAIRLY – TOWARDS FAIR OUTCOMES FOR CONSUMERS (2006), available at
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/ fca/documents/fsa-tcf-towards.pdf.
39
Georgosouli, supra note 36, at 416.
40
A&L was fined £7,000,000. Post crisis, financial firms were made to pay
much higher fines. See Press Release, Fin. Cond. Auth., FCA Fines Lloyds
Banking Group First a Total of £28,038,800 for Serious Sales Incentive Failings
(Nov. 12, 2013), available at http://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-fineslloyds-banking-group-firms-for-serious-sales-incentive-failings; Final Notice from
Fin. Conduct Auth. to Lloyds TSB Bank plc and Bank of Scotland plc (Dec. 10,
2013),
available
at
http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/finalnotices/2013/lloyds-tsb-bank-and-bank-of-scotland.
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this programme, A&L undertook, amongst other things, to contact all
customers that purchased PPI in conjunction with an unsecured loan, to
review its policy in respect of product information that was sent to these
customers, to review any rejected complaints and claims, and to pay redress
where appropriate. A&L demonstrates that, at least in theory, the
regulator’s enforcement strategy goes beyond penalizing unacceptable
forms of business conduct. The offender’s failure to comply with TCF is
seen as an opportunity for the offender to reflect on what went wrong and
make things right by taking remedial action, revising processes, practices,
and ultimately its corporate culture.41 This approach survived the upheaval
of regulatory reform in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis and it is
now crystallised in various dispute resolution provisions of the FCA
Handbook. Accordingly, it remains a key element of the regulator’s
strategy.42

41

See Howard Becker, Culture: A Sociological View, 71 YALE REV. 513
(1982) (describing culture as shared understandings that permit a group of people
to act in concert with each other); Roger Cotterrell, Law and Culture – Inside and
Beyond the National State, 31 NORDIC J.L. & JUST. 23, 23–36 (2008) (Nor.)
(identifying four cultural components namely ‘beliefs/values’, ‘traditions’,
‘instrumental matters’ (economic, technological) and ‘matters of effect’
(emotions)); Justin O’Brien et al., Culture and the Future of Financial Regulation:
How to Embed Restraint in the Interests of Systemic Stability, 8 L. & FIN.
MARKETS REV. 115, 126 (2014) (identifying five sources of cultures); Jasper
Sorensen, The Strength of Corporate Culture and Reliability of Firm Performance,
47 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 70, 72 (2002) (offering a narrow definition of culture as a
system of shared values).
42
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 31, at 2, 4 (2014) (reflecting the
recommendations made by the FSA in FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE ASSESSMENT AND
REDRESS OF PAYMENT PROTECTION INSURANCE COMPLAINTS (2009)); FIN. SERVS.
AUTH., THE ASSESSMENT AND REDRESS OF PAYMENT PROTECTION INSURANCE
COMPLAINTS
§§
3.26,
4.7
(2009),
available
at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp09_23.pdf (recommending firms to proactively
reassess all complaints and consider whether a wider redress programme would be
appropriate, namely one which would include the proactive redress of PPI
customers who have not complained); H. Osborne, PPI Mis-Selling: Banks to
Write to up to 12 Million Customers, GUARDIAN (March 6, 2012),
http://www.theguardian.com/money/2012/mar/06/ppi-misselling-banks-writecustomers.
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In implementing the TCF agenda, the FCA is further assisted by
the Financial Ombudsman Service (“FOS”).43 Although it is not the
purpose of this Article to examine the powers and role of the FOS as a
guardian of best practice in the retail financial sector, it is important to note
that its involvement goes beyond dispute resolution and consumer redress.
FOS decisions are instrumental in the cultivation of a common
understanding of what TCF entails in practice. They inform the
interpretation of TCF requirements and, in the long run, they provide
guidance on the expected level of performance in delivering fair treatment
to customers.
Several considerations informed the decision of the UK regulator
to implement TCF.44 As with any other typical scheme of managementbased regulation, TCF embraces self-regulation. This makes it morally
appealing because it subscribes to a vision of the regulatory community,
the members of which are assumed to be capable of working out for
themselves the public standards that ought to govern their relationships.
Self-regulation also tends to create a sense of legitimacy, as it bears out
standards of conduct that are made by the industry and for the industry,
albeit under the watchful eye and quasi-approval of the regulator.
The management-based and performance-oriented elements in TCF
also have the potential to tackle a series of persistent problems that are
associated with the old-school ‘command and control’ regulation.
Examples include those of creative compliance, the cost of rulemaking and
enforcement, lack of flexibility, and problems of over and under
inclusiveness.45 As the argument goes, the articulation of a specific set of
outcomes helps firms concentrate on what matters, namely performance in
delivering certain goals rather than sticking to the letter of the law. The
informal means of communicating the regulator’s TCF expectations are
43

In the past, FOS alerted the UK regulator about emerging trends concerning
poor standards of conduct of business practices and the case for regulatory action.
See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., COMPLAINT HANDLING PROCEDURES OF THE FINANCIAL
OMBUDSMAN
SERVICE
(2014),
available
at
http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/DISP/3.
44
See Georgosouli, supra note 36, at 417–420, for a more detailed discussion.
45
On the limitations of rules as instruments of social organisation and control
see generally JULIA BLACK, RULES AND REGULATORS ch. 1 (1997); Colin Diver,
The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983)
(approaching the matter from a law and economics perspective); Doug McBarnet
& Christopher Whelan, The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism and the Struggle
for Legal Control, 54 M.L.R. 848 (1991).
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also thought to be more flexible and less time consuming. Moreover, they
arguably place the regulator in a better position to obtain crucial and timely
information that is essential for the formation of judgments with respect to
compliance, the expediency of enforcement action, and even the case for
reform.
TCF also affords a more participatory and discursive approach to
regulation. The latter carries with it the promise of being more effective in
aligning the industry’s perceptions with the goals and views of the
regulator.46 As the argument goes, long-term cultural change is more likely
to happen with industry engagement, not least because in this manner, the
regulatees are expected to become more cognizant of their responsibilities
in delivering TCF outcomes and also more sophisticated in sensing what
TCF requires even in the presence of new or unforeseen circumstances.
Moreover, regulatees who are given the chance to decide how best to
proceed in their attempt to incorporate TCF into their business culture are
more likely to view it as reasonable and thus worthy of compliance.
Finally, by granting firms the flexibility to develop their own strategies,
TCF enables firms to experiment and seek out better and more innovative
solutions.
Finally, there are several advantages to note in relation to the
FCA’s policy of reactive intervention in the context of the TCF initiative.
The desirability of enforcement action is assessed in light of its likely
impact on the industry’s capacity to develop patterns of self-regulation. It
is forward-looking in the sense that it aims to educate the regulated
industry and to encourage a change of culture.47 Being partly premised on
negotiation, the enforcement procedure itself creates opportunities for the
alleged offender to deliberate with the regulator, become cognizant of its
failure to comply, remedy any wrongdoing, and revise its business practice
where appropriate.

46

See Black, supra note 45, at 37–44, for a classic exposition of the nature of
conversational regulation. See also Andromachi Georgosouli, Regulatory
Interpretation: Conversational or Constructive?, 30 O.J.L.S. 361, 361–84 (2010),
for a critical evaluation of the view of regulation as conversational.
47
See Sorensen, supra note 41, at 15.
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TRACING THE CAUSES OF THE TCF FAILURE TO DETER
PPI MIS-SELLING
A.

THE RULIFICATION OF TCF

In its original inception, TCF departs from the traditional rulebook
approach. It seems to be based on the belief that, in the absence of rules,
problems like, for example, that of legal uncertainty – vanish automatically.
However, the reality is different. Legal certainty may no longer be a
function of the design of rules, but it is certainly contingent to the informal
means through which regulatory expectations are communicated. Judging
from past experience, the text of these informal means of communication is
no less authoritative than the content of the FCA Handbook. In the case of
TCF, informal communication failed to convey with clarity the regulator’s
expectations. 48
One would expect that the informal and flexible nature of TCF
would compensate for the perceived legal uncertainty surrounding its
implementation, but this is not what happened. By and large, firms have
been reluctant to take initiative and exercise the level of discretion that was
delegated to them. They preferred more detailed regulatory guidance.
Conversely, when they did exercise discretion, the outcomes were not to
the regulator’s satisfaction. In view of this, TCF soon evolved into a
rulified regime.49 The response of the UK regulator was a conspicuous
proliferation of detailed and legally binding rules and guidance. In 2007, in
particular, and after repeated failings to combat misconduct, the UK
regulator introduced more detailed ICOBS rules50 in the name of clarity
51

and certainty. At the same time though, it continued to communicate its
expectations regarding TCF through informal guidance.
Indeed, the UK regulator did not give up the idea of self-regulation
as the main conduit of change in the business culture of retail firms. In this
spirit, it reassured the industry that the changes in the ICOBS did not
amount to a ‘command and control’ approach and that informal
communications and non-legally binding guidance would continue to be
48

See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 32.
See Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of
Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803 (2004), for a general discussion.
50
See supra pp. 7-8 (discussing new ICOB rules).
51
See infra pp. 20–24 where formal enforcement is discussed in the context of
credible deterrence.
49
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relied upon. This was thought appropriate to allow for a degree of
flexibility that would make possible for firms to develop patterns of selfregulation, however, legal uncertainty remained an issue.52 So did the
firms’ reluctance to commit to the ideal of self-regulation.53
B.

TCF AND THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF ‘BIG DATA’

The implementation of TCF requires increasing capacity to collect
and process data, as, for example, for the purposes of managing emerging
risks as a preventive measure, or for the purposes of effective enforcement.
The UK regulator recommends the Management Information (“MI”)
framework as a tool for the management and processing of data.54
Essentially, MI standardises the process of collecting information during a
period of business activity with respect to key issues that are of relevance
to TCF. It makes it easier for managers to put information in perspective
and align it with the regulator’s expectations. Furthermore, the data
collected serves as evidence of the firm’s capacity to meet performance
targets.
The data that is produced and accumulated at the level of each
regulated firm is then fed into the regulatory system via GABRIEL
(Gathering Better Regulatory Information Electronically).55 The latter is an
online reporting platform for the collection, validation and storage of data.
The nature of the data that a firm is expected to report to the FCA via
GABRIEL varies. In any case, it depends on the regulated activities that
the firm undertakes and the prudential category into which the firm is
classified. GABRIEL makes a special reporting provision for PPI related
data. This signifies the importance of data collection and processing as a
necessary precondition for the timely identification of TCF-related risks
and, where appropriate, for the taking of disciplinary action.
Although, both the MI and the special PPI reporting through
GABRIEL are welcome developments, they are subject to limitations.
There is no doubt that MI makes it easier for firms to deal with a tangible
problem, that of information management and the associated cost of
52

See Andromachi Georgosouli, Judgment-led Regulation: Reflections on
Data and Discretion, 14 J.B.R. 209, 210 (2013).
53
See infra p. 24.
54
The FSA introduced the MI framework. FIN. SERVS AUTH., supra note 32, 4.
55
See generally GABRIEL, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Aug. 26, 2014),
http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/systems-reporting/gabriel.
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processing an ever-growing volume of information.56 However, this is as
far as it goes. MI cannot guarantee the reliability of the data that is made
available to the regulator. The data that is eventually channelled through
the regulator’s system of decision-making is as good as the data produced
at regulated firm level.
As we learn from empirical studies on the use of big data by the
medical professions in the US, there are several pitfalls and shortcomings
in the process of electronic reporting.57 Apart from errors due to software
failures, problems may occur as a result of typing quickly, ticking the
wrong boxes, or copying and pasting out-dated or otherwise wrong
information.58 To the extent that the reporting forms allow for the addition
of free text, contradictions may also occur between the content of the free
text and the content of the standard text. There is no reason to think that
the electronic reporting systems that are currently deployed by the industry
and the FCA are immune from shortcomings like those reported in the
medical profession.
The accumulated data is the product of self-assessment exercises,
which are riddled with human bias. For example, firm employees are
unlikely to disclose non-favourable information, especially when there is a
little chance that the regulator will ever find out about this.59 Similarly, they
are unlikely to pass on information that is harmful to them or their fellows.
Human judgement is also subject to “automation” bias namely the tendency
to disregard information which contradicts information that is generally
accepted as correct.60 Last but not least, the reward and incentive structure

56

See, however, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, INTELLIGENT MANAGEMENT
COMPLIANCE COST REDUCTION 10–12 (2008) (demonstrating that
management-based regulation is expensive in its implementation).
57
See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgorski, The Use of Biomedical
Data: Is Bigger Really Better? 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 497, 499–502 (2013).
Nevertheless, the authors point out that digitalization can prevent some data quality
problems, such as those associated with illegible handwriting.
58
Id. at 515–16, 519–20.
59
See John C. Coffee Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical
View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV.
1099, 1146, 1242 (1977).
60
See generally Steven T. Schwarcz & David E. Wallin, Behavioural
Implications of Information Systems on Disclosure Fraud, 14 BEHAV. RES. IN
ACCT. 197 (2002) (arguing that the use of computer data increases the likelihood
of this pattern of behaviour).
AND
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of firms gives rise to another type of bias namely, the “self-serving bias”.61
This describes the tendency to interpret ambiguous information in a manner
that is favourable to one’s self.
The quality of information may be further compromised due to
certain structural features of the electronic reporting system – most notably
that of data fragmentation. In the case under examination, it is interesting
to note, for example, that the special PPI reporting requirement applies only
to those firms that have been asked to provide monthly data on specific PPI
management information.62 The rest must follow the usual path and submit
electronically information that is classified as data pertaining to product
sales, complaints handling, etc. This differential treatment that is reflected
in terms of ‘who’ is to submit PPI-related data makes sense especially
when seeing through the lens of risk-based regulation, according to which
resources should be directed in priority to the monitoring of those firms
that pose a higher risk to the delivery of TCF outcomes. However, this
approach can be problematic.
Data that is submitted for the purposes of reporting on product
sales and complaints handling can also be PPI-sensitive despite the fact that
it is not earmarked as such at the time of its submission to GABRIEL.
Accordingly, a danger here is that its PPI-relevance will escape the
regulator’s attention. There is an additional issue of concern here. Due to
its structural features, GABRIEL is bound to produce more data for those
firms that are already put under the spotlight because they present a higher
risk of failure to meet TCF targets. Conversely, GABRIEL is expected to
produce less data for the purposes of proactive intervention and in
particular with respect to lower risk retail financial services providers
whose business culture may nevertheless call for attention as it may not be
compatible with TCF goals in the long run. The suboptimal production of
data for the purposes of proactive intervention is not a trivial matter. It is
liable to undermine the regulator’s attempt to map out the prevailing
business culture of the firm in question accurately and to decide appropriate
course of action in a timely fashion.

61

See generally Jeffrey Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for
Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1172–73 (2003) (offering a classification of
various types of self-serving bias).
62
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., PAYMENT PROTECTION INSURANCE (PPI) REPORTING
FORM (2014), available at http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/systems-reporting/ppireporting-forms.
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The UK regulator has not done enough to put in place interoperable data systems and take steps to ensure that collected data is
integrated into a single data. This could ameliorate the difficulties that are
associated with data fragmentation.63 For example, the so-called Integrated
Regulatory Reporting (“IRR”) does not serve as a universally integrated
system of data resource management.64 It does harmonize inconsistent
reporting formats, but its scope of application is very limited. On the one
hand, it is calibrated to comply with the transparency requirements of the
Capital Requirements Directive (“CRD”) and the Markets in Financial
Instruments Directive (“MiFID”).65 On the other hand, it applies to a very
specific group of regulated firms, namely investment management firms,
securities and futures firms, and firms that enter into regulated mortgage
contracts or administer regulated mortgage contracts.66
The problem of data fragmentation is further exacerbated by the
fact that the FCA and the PRA collect data separately.67 Although the two
regulators are expected to share information along the lines of a
Memorandum of Understanding, delays and turf wars cannot be precluded
over sensitive information.68 Furthermore, the two regulators may not
necessarily share the same view when they assess whether a piece of
information should be brought to the attention of the other regulator in the
first place or as a matter of priority.
63

See generally Hoffman & Podgorski, supra note 57, at 517–518 (discussing
the harms and causes of incomplete or fragmented data).
64
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FCA-PRA COMBINED HANDBOOK § 16.12 (2014),
available at http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/handbook/SUP/16/12 (making IRR
mandatory); see also CPAAUDIT LLP, GUIDE TO INTEGRATED REGULATORY
REPORTING (RII) AND MANDATORY ELECTRONIC REPORTING (MER) FOR
INVESTMENT
FIRMS
(2008),
available
at
http://www.cpaaudit.co.uk/pdfs/IRRandMERGuide.pdf.
65
See Rebecca Atkinson, FSA Issues Integrated Regulatory Reporting Paper,
MORTGAGE STRATEGY (June 1, 2006), http://www.mortgagestrategy. co.uk/isaissues-integrated-regulatory-reporting-paper/123106.article.
66
See CPA AUDIT LLP, supra note 64, at 1.
67
HM TREASURY, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU): BETWEEN THE
FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY (FCA) AND THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
AUTHORITY (PRA) (Apr. 22, 2013), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/memorandum-of-understanding-between-the-financial-conduct-authorityand-the-bank-of-england-including-the-prudential-regulation-authority.
68
See generally Georgosouli, supra note 14, 63–66, for a critical evaluation of
the FCA and PRA coordination arrangements under the Financial Services Act
2012.

280

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 21.1

An integral aspect of the creation of computer software is the
reduction of regulatory commands into code. The latter poses a range of
challenges. The code is bound to reflect the professional programmers’
beliefs about how TCF should be interpreted in practice. When these
beliefs are not consistent with those of the regulator, there is a risk that
firms end up using computer software (e.g. computer software that supports
a firm’s system of data resource management pertaining to TCF) whose
code encapsulates an understanding of TCF that may actually be words
apart from that which was originally envisaged by the regulator. As a
result of this incompatibility, important risks are unlikely to be detected or
indeed properly identified and responded to.
In view of this problem, one would expect that at least some form
of quasi-monitoring be in place at the production stage of computer
software so that a minimum calibration and compatibility is secured. This
would also keep at bay several inconsistencies and unnecessary
discrepancies in the design of the code, however, at the moment, the FCA
goes as far as to provide a list of Independent Software Vendors (“ISVs”)
for the purpose of assisting the industry in finding software suppliers.
Moreover, and in order to avoid any misconception to the contrary, this list
is followed with a disclaimer that the “FCA does not endorse or
recommend any ISV listed.”69
C.

TCF AND THE DESIDERATUM OF CREDIBLE DETERRENCE

Credible deterrence requires enforcement action that is visible
enough so that wrongdoers realise that they face a real risk of being held
accountable and of bearing the tangible consequences of disciplinary
action.70 The UK regulator did not always give emphasis to formal
enforcement as a tool for credible deterrence.71
Pre-crisis, the motto was “prevention is better than cure.” Initially,
the FSA relied on a combination of principles and rules in order to regulate
69

Independent Software Vendors, FIN. SERVS. AUTH. (Jul. 11, 2014),
http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/systems-reporting/gabriel/tech-publications/list-ofisvs.
70
Howard Rockness & Joanne Rockness, Legislated Ethics: from Enron to
Sarbanes-Oxley, the Impact of Corporate America, 57 J. BUS. ETHICS 21, 50–51
(2005) (highlighting the need for meaningful sanctions and fines that exceed
gains).
71
Ferran, supra note 6, at 260–61.
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the sale of PPI ranging from the Eleven High Level Principles for Business
(“PRIN”) to rules on systems and controls (“SYSC”), training and
competence (“TC”), and rules on how to handle customer complaints
(“DISP”). Eventually, these were further supplemented by a more detailed
version of the ICOBS. The legal enforcement of these rules was not at the
top of the priorities of the UK regulator. The emphasis was on persuasion
and the industry was expected to voluntarily adhere to Handbook
provisions. The industry’s enrolment was viewed as key to proactive
regulation and self-regulation was relied upon as the main conduit of
cultural change. The fact that the FSA’s policy of deterrence was not
enforcement-led does not mean that enforcement was missing. Even in the
early years, enforcement –for example, through the imposition of
administrative fines- had a role to play in sending the message that noncompliance would not be tolerated, but it was clearly employed as a last
resort.72
Post-crisis, and after an increasing number of instances of financial
misselling, the FSA became concerned that its enforcement strategy was
neither preventive nor visible enough to change industry attitudes.73 The
probability of enforcement was not considered a credible threat as much as
a consideration that it would make firms think twice before breaking the
rules.74 Scepticism also started to grow about the extent to which it is
72

See generally Margaret Cole, Dir. of Enforcement, Fin. Servs. Auth., Annual
Financial Crimes Conference: Delivering Credible Deterrence (Apr. 27, 2009),
available
at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/
Speeches/2009/0427_mc.shtml; Margaret Cole, Dir. of Enforcement, Fin. Servs. Auth.,
Enforcement Law Conference: How Enforcement Makes a Difference (June 18, 2008),
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2008/
0618_mc.shtml.
73
See Letter from Andrew Tyrie, Member of Parliament, U.K., to Fin.
Ombudsman
Serv.
(Dec.
19,
2012),
available
at
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/treasury/121
219FOS-PPI-capacity-planning.pdf; see also NICK WAUGH & CHRISTIE SILK, THE
COST OF REDRESS: THE LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE PPI MIS-SELLING
SCANDAL 8 (2014), available at http://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/index/
policy/policy_publications/er_consumertravelandtransport/the_cost_of_redress.ht
m.
74
See Tracey McDermott, Dir. of Enforcement & Fin. Crime, Fin. Conduct
Auth., Enforcement and Credible Deterrence in the FCA, Address at the Thompson
Reuters Compliance and Risk Summit, at 3–5, 7–8 (clarifying that the regulator’s
role is to test and challenge assertions about what the culture of an institution is)
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feasible to attune business culture to the delivery of public policy goals and
to foster patterns of self-governance in an industry that was demonstrably
hostile to self-regulation. In view of this, the FSA introduced a new
strategy. This made its first appearance in the FSA 2007/8 Annual Report
and was labelled “credible deterrence” to mark a toughening up of the
regulator’s enforcement action.75
The FCA continues this approach, but also enjoys more powers to
become a credible enforcer of TCF.76 As pointed out above, the parent
legislation now entrusts the FCA with enhanced powers to use transparency
as an enforcement tool in the sense that it is now possible for the regulator
to publish information about a disciplinary action at an earlier stage than in
the past provided that certain conditions are met.77 Product intervention is
another key element of the new strategy. At least on paper the FCA has
more interventionist powers at its disposal under new sections 137C to
137D and 137M to 137N of the FSMA 2000 as recently amended by the
FSA 2012.78 These are further complemented by new sections 137P to
137Q, which set out more powers to intervene in respect of financial
promotions.79

(June 18, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.fca.org.uk/static/
documents/enforcement-credible-deterrence-speech.pdf).
75
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT, 2007-8, H.C., at 6 (U.K.).
76
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY: APPROACH TO
REGULATION 25 (2011).
77
Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 391 (U.K.) (amended
2010). Section 391 incorporates further extension of transparency-enhancing
changes made by the Financial Services Act 2010. Id. The FSA’s use of these
powers has already been challenged by way of judicial review and in the Upper
Tribunal. See R ex rel. S v. X, [2011] EWHC (Admin) 1645, [4]–[10] (Eng.)
(addressing the claimant’s appeal of the FSA’s decision notice to the Upper
Tribunal and granting an interim injunction to restrain the FSA from publishing the
notice); R ex rel. Can. Inc. v. Fin. Servs. Auth., [2011] EHWC (Admin) 2766
(Eng.).
78
Financial Services Act, 2012, c. 21, § 137C–137D, 137M–137N (U.K).
79
Some of the FCA’s key priorities in respect to consumer credit reveal the
intention of the UK regulator to make use of its new powers. These priorities
include (a) the review of financial promotions, (b) the improvement of debt
management standards, (c) considering the introduction of price caps on what
payday lenders can actually charge, (d) assessing regularly how the industry treats
financial difficulties, and (e) getting a better understanding of the economic
behavior of consumers. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., BUSINESS PLAN 2014/15 (2014),
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Firms are still required to demonstrate an ongoing commitment,
right up to the board level, in securing right outcomes for their customers,
particularly consumers.80 Furthermore, senior managers that repeatedly fail
to deliver now face greater chances of becoming the target of the FCA’s
enforcement action.81 Last but not least, there is now the possibility of mass
consumer redress, the aim of which is to ensure consistent redress
outcomes for consumers in a timelier fashion.82
There is no doubt that these amendments to the TCF legal
framework bear the potential of cementing the FCA’s enforcement action if
indeed the FCA decides to move from simply expressing intentions to the
taking of action. Nevertheless, the fact remains that post-crisis, visibility of
enforcement action of the UK regulator is still lacking. Although it is true
that we witnessed a peak in formal enforcement between 2006 and 2008, it
is equally true that enforcement action regarding PPI tailed off more
recently, given that the regulator’s priority remains that of securing redress
for the numerous victims of PPI misselling rather than to punish
wrongdoers for their misconduct.83 Formal enforcement is still considered a
measure of last resort while dialogue and persuasion continue to be the
preferred course of action for behaviour modification.84 There is a good
reason for this. Formal enforcement takes time to bring fruits let alone
secure large-scale consumer redress. In a similar fashion, early settlement
is thought to be in the public interest because it secures redress for the
victims of PPI misselling, and it is speedier and less expensive relative to
other alternatives.
available at http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/ corporate/business-plan2014-2015.pdf.
80
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., TREATING CUSTOMERS FAIRLY: PROGRESS UPDATE 15
(2008), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/ tcf_progress.pdf.
81
McDermott, supra note 74, at 5–7.
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Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, §§ 404-404G (U.K.)
(amended 2010); Richard Peat et al., Imposing Consumer Redress Schemes, 32
COMPANY LAW. 183 (2011).
83
See Financial Services and Markets Act § 2(2) (providing that the primary
regulatory objectives include the protection of consumers); see Patrick Collinson,
Ombudsman Still Receiving 1,000 Complaints a Day on PPI Mis-Selling,
(Mar.
4,
2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/money/
GUARDIAN
2014/mar/04/ombudsman-receives-1000-ppi-misselling-complaints (indicating a
steep drop in number of enforcement cases for PPI misselling).
84
See generally Financial Services and Markets Act §§ 225–34 (providing a
mechanism for adjudication of certain disputes with “minimum formality”).
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The credibility of enforcement also calls for consistent policy.
Otherwise it is difficult for the regulator to convey the seriousness of its
intention. Experience in the UK suggests that the intensity of enforcement
action varies and that it is by and large driven by the prevailing political
climate. For example, the FSA’s willingness to proceed to formal
enforcement gained momentum during the recent financial turmoil, that is
to say, at a time when there has been great political pressure to bring cases
to court. As collective memory of the financial crisis of 2008 fades away,
the regulator’s commitment to formal enforcement is expected to recede.
The possibility of early settlement and the tendency to resort to
private warnings at the supervisory stage and in exclusion from any further
enforcement action are two further features of the UK regulator’s approach
that undermine the visibility of disciplinary action. Specifically, under the
current regime, the industry is given several incentives to opt for early
settlement, such as discounts and the reduction of financial penalties.85 The
downside of this is that nobody takes notice given that these early stages of
disciplinary action are carried out away from the public eye. Private
warnings at the supervisory stage are arguably the most serious form of
reprimand during ongoing supervisory correspondence.
They
communicate the regulator’s concerns about the firm’s conduct and that
disciplinary action may follow as a result of this, but again this
correspondence is kept confidential and may never materialise into a
widely publicized formal enforcement action.
The credibility of deterrence practices of the UK regulators has
been further eroded by the industry’s reluctance to genuinely engage with
the regulator to secure fair treatment for customers.86 This is evident, for
example, (a) in the large number of PPI complaints being referred to the
FOS, (b) in the discrepancy in outcomes between PPI complaints that were
referred to the FOS and those that were handled by firms87 and (c) more
recently, in the industry’s attempt to challenge the FSA’s decision to take
85

FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., DECISION PROCEDURE AND PENALTIES MANUAL §
6.7 (2014), available at http://media.fshandbook.info/content/FCA/ DEPP.pdf. For
information on the discount rates, see id.
86
See Final Notice from the Fin. Servs. Auth. to the Co-operative Bank PLC
(Jan. 4, 2013), available at http://www.fca.org.uk/static/ fca/documents/finalnotices/co-op.pdf; Lloyds TSB Bank Plc, supra note 6. See also McDermott, supra
note 74 (discussing this erosion).
87
See Collinson, supra note 83 (noting the increased flow of PPI complaints
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enforcement action following the industry’s failure to take into account
FOS decisions in handling customer complaints, contrary to the regulator’s
expectations, as these were communicated informally in a Policy Statement
(“PS”).88
In its judicial review action the industry argued that PRIN are not
actionable by suit by a private person in view of the wording of old section
150 of the FSMA 2000.89 Accordingly, they could not give rise to redress
obligations. In addition, the industry claimed that regulatory principles
could not conflict with or augment specific rules.90 Finally, it contended
that the existence of an alternative statutory collective redress scheme
precluded the FSA from taking the action that was set out in the Policy
Statement.91 The industry eventually lost its case on all three grounds.92 In
the course of bringing the action, several firms put on hold the handling of
nearly all PPI complaints. This caused significant delays in the system,
eventually leading to the large pay-outs in the second term of 2011.93 Most
importantly though, it aggravated the situation in the eyes of the UK
regulator and undermined past attempts to build trust.
V.

CONCLUSION

The principle that customers must be treated fairly has a long
history in the UK. So does the problem of PPI misselling, which the
Treating Customers Fairly initiative aims to tackle. I tried to demonstrate
in this Article that TCF looks good on paper. It intends to be flexible
enough to let firms adapt regulatory mandates according to their individual
circumstances and it encourages firms to develop their self-regulatory
capacities in a manner that bolsters TCF targets, namely tangible public
policy outcomes. However, in practice, the recurring instances of PP
misselling indicate that TCF has, thus far, made little difference.
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This Article traced the causes of this shortcoming, focusing in
particular on the rulification of TCF, some difficulties associated with the
system of data resource management that is currently in use, and the
absence of a system of credible deterrence to back up the regulator’s
attempt to inflict long-term cultural change in the interests of consumers.
Several lessons may be drawn from the UK experience with TCF. All of
them illustrate that the focus on “outcomes” rather than “principles” does
not necessary guarantee better performance in attaining public policy
objectives.
For a start, the implementation of TCF in the UK demonstrates that
the choice to depart from the traditional rulebook approach does not
necessarily offer a better solution to the pervasive problem of striking the
proper balance between, on the one hand, certainty and predictability and,
on the other hand, flexibility and adaptability. TCF was informal in its
inception, but eventually it became rulified and sclerotic, in view of the
measures that were taken to respond to the industry’s constant pressure for
more detailed guidance.
Further, the regime of intensive supervision that has been
associated with the implementation of the rulified TCF is likely to have
contributed to the regulatees’ general reluctance to exercise judgement and
discretion and to adopt an attitude of reflective compliance with rules and
guidance. Instead of being “enabling” and “engaging,” in all probability
the regulator’s near omnipresence in the internal affairs of the regulated
firms left hardly any scope for reflection and healthy experimentation and
made the regulatees either more complacent or less confident in their
expertise and judgement.
The UK experience with the implementation of TCF also
highlights the relevance of big data in making the whole initiative a
success. Specifically, it reveals how the computer software that supports
data resource management can actually hinder regulators from making
sound judgments. This occurs when the software is not properly designed
or when errors, undermining the reliability and accuracy of the data
produced, are not identified and properly addressed at an early stage. Who
develops computer software for data resource management is also of
practical importance. Professional programmers do not necessarily
understand what TCF requires in practice in the same way as the regulator
does. To the extent in which the articulation of TCF outcomes may turn
out to be different from what was originally intended, computer software
that is specifically calibrated to ensure compliance with TCF may in reality
be at odds with the intended TCF goals.

2014

PAYMENT PROTECTION INSURANCE

287

In view of the fact that technology shapes the meaning of TCF
goals and may even translate TCF goals into a course of action that is
worlds apart from what the regulator would recommend, some further
issues that require immediate attention include, but are not limited to, the
following: (a) The determination of the respective roles of the State and the
market in developing the software that would support the operationalization
of a consolidated system of data resource management; (b) whether some
sort of a licensing regime would be appropriate as a mechanism that would
ensure consistency between the regulator’s understanding of TCF and that
of software developers’; (c) how to make sure that the relevant software is
constantly updated so that it keeps pace with market developments; (d)
whether it is desirable to have in place inter-operable data systems with
means for monitoring and correcting data errors built into them (e.g.,
automatic alerts regarding the entry of anomalous values); and (e) whether
it is expedient to standardize terms and industry jargon.
Finally, the lack of credible deterrence brings to the surface an
inevitable trade off between two conflicting policy considerations that
cannot be ignored: on the one hand, the need to secure timely and costefficient consumer redress and, on the other, the need to ensure that law
enforcement is visible enough to deter. The UK experience highlights that
it is not possible to have both. While securing financial redress in a timely
fashion justifies early settlement, credible deterrence pulls in the opposite
direction because it calls for a course of action that is more time consuming
(typically this would involve bringing a case to the courts) and a gamble to
retail customers.
The increasing emphasis on business culture suggests that the FCA
is cognisant of this trade off and that it has made a deliberate choice to
boost market discipline by challenging the business culture that prevails in
the industry. This is a welcome development, but it will take time to bring
fruits. In any case, the potency of culture as a regulatory tool should not be
blown out of proportion.
At least in part, the efficacy of the regulator to instigate cultural
change depends on the willingness of the firms to genuinely engage with
the regulator and – when challenged – to reflect on the soundness of their
respective culture in order to amend business practices where appropriate.
Persistent industry regression leaves little scope for optimism. In this
regard, it is interesting to note that in the past the policy of the FSA was to
offer firms a “regulatory dividend” in the form of less scrutiny, as an
incentive to make them behave well demonstrating essentially that
customer interests were central to the corporate culture of the business in
question. This policy reflected an assumption that the vast majority of
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firms had the intention to treat their customers fairly and that the majority
were willing to engage openly and positively with the regulator. Both
assumptions proved to be naïve in reality.
Retail financial firms are not charities working in the interests of
customers. They are profit-driven institutions. A business culture that ends
up reflecting both the profit-driven character of the business and the firm’s
perceived commitment to public policy goals, like fair treatment for
customers, is bound to be self-defeating because it constitutes a
contradiction in terms. One must take priority, and quite intuitively this
will have to be profit. Otherwise, the business will not be able to survive.
This is not to say that no good can come out of business culture as a tool
for improving the effectiveness of TCF. It can, but in all probability, it is
going to be less than we are inclined to think. Profit-making considerations
confine how far TCF can go in aligning the goals and priorities of the
industry with those of the regulator and, by implication, to what extent it is
possible to rely on business culture. Accordingly, when designing and
implementing TCF, a healthy dose of pragmatism is called for to make it a
credible policy in the first place.

